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FROM HOMICIDAL YOUTHS TO 
REFORMED ADULTS: PAROLE HEARING 
PROCEDURES FOR JUVENILE 
HOMICIDE OFFENDERS IN DIATCHENKO 
v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE
SUFFOLK DISTRICT 
PAULA TRAHOS* 
Abstract: In 2013, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, following a 
United States Supreme Court case, Miller v. Alabama, held that all juvenile 
homicide offenders would have an opportunity for parole after serving fifteen 
years in prison. Subsequently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in 
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, held that juvenile homi-
cide offenders are entitled to representation by counsel at parole hearings, funds 
for expert witnesses, and can be granted judicial review of parole board deci-
sions. The majority afforded these additional procedures with the intention of 
providing juvenile homicide offenders with a meaningful opportunity for re-
lease. The dissent argued that the majority overstepped their judicial boundaries 
and entered the executive realm by combining criminal sentencing with parole 
hearing procedures. This Comment argues that the majority appropriately grant-
ed juvenile homicide offenders parole hearing procedural protections. 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 9, 1981, seventeen-year-old Gregory Diatchenko stabbed 
Thomas Wharf to death near Kenmore Square in Boston.1 A jury convicted 
Diatchenko of murder in the first degree and sentenced him to a mandatory 
term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.2 Five years later, 
on July 29, 1986, Jeffrey Roberio, also seventeen, beat and strangled seven-
ty-nine year old Lewis Jennings to death.3 As with Diatchenko, a jury found 
Roberio guilty of murder in the first degree and sentenced him to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.4 
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2015–2016.
1 Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. (Diatchenko II), 1 N.E.3d 270, 274 (Mass. 
2013). 
2 Id. 
3 See Commonwealth v. Roberio, 700 N.E.2d 830, 831 (Mass. 1998). 
4 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 2(a) (2014) (requiring that a person found guilty of murder in 
the first degree shall be imprisoned for life and is not eligible for parole); see Roberio, 700 N.E.2d 
at 830. 
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Nearly thirty years after Diatchenko’s and Roberio’s convictions, the 
United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, holding that sen-
tencing a juvenile to life without parole is a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s “prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”5 Conse-
quently, Diatchenko filed a petition for post-conviction relief, seeking retro-
active application of Miller, with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts (“Diatchenko II”).6 The court held that Miller had retroactive applica-
tion for cases on collateral review and that sentencing juvenile homicide 
offenders to life without parole was an unconstitutionally disproportionate 
punishment in violation of article XXVI, part 1 of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution’s prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishments.”7 
The holding in Diatchenko II acknowledged that giving life without 
parole was a disproportionate punishment considering that the offense was 
committed by a juvenile, yet it left open the issue concerning how a juvenile 
homicide offender’s opportunity for release on parole would be protected.8 
To ensure that their opportunity for release through parole would be mean-
ingful, Diatchenko and Roberio filed petitions with the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts (“Diatchenko III”) arguing that access to counsel, 
funds for expert witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review of the 
decision on their parole applications were necessary.9 In Diatchenko III, the 
court’s majority agreed and held that, given the significance of a mandatory 
life sentence to juvenile homicide offenders, the parole process takes on a 
constitutional liberty interest.10 Thus, juvenile homicide offenders should 
have access to counsel, fees for expert witnesses, and judicial review of pa-
role board decisions.11 The dissent argued that, by imposing additional proce-
dural protections on the parole process, the court usurped the executive pow-
er’s regulation of parole hearings, incorporating it into the sentencing pro-
cess.12 
Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the factual and procedural 
history of Diatchenko III. Part II discusses the reasoning of the majority in 
holding that parole hearings for juvenile homicide offenders require due 
                                                                                                                           
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 275 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 
S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012)). 
 6 See Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 275. 
 7 MASS. CONST. art. XXVI; Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. (Diatchenko 
III), 27 N.E.3d 349, 353 n.3 (Mass. 2015) (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455) (explaining that the 
term “juvenile homicide offender” refers to a person who has been convicted of murder in the first 
degree and was under the age of eighteen at the time the murder was committed); see Diatchenko 
II, 1 N.E.3d at 280, 281. 
 8 See Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 353; Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 284. 
 9 See Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 353. 
 10 See id. at 357. 
 11 See id. at 353. 
 12 See id. at 370 (Spina, J., dissenting). 
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process procedural protections in contrast to the dissent’s opinion, which 
argued that parole is an executive action separate and distinct from a judi-
cial sentence. Finally, Part III argues that the approach taken by the majority 
was appropriate given the inherent differences between juveniles and adults. 
I. JUVENILE HOMICIDE OFFENDERS AND THE PATH TO PAROLE 
On the evening of May 9, 1981, Boston police officer Peter Jerome re-
sponded to a radio call at approximately 9:45 p.m. directing him to 
Kenmore Square.13 Upon arriving, the officer found Thomas Wharf “uncon-
scious and bleeding in the driver’s seat of a red Cadillac automobile.”14 At 
trial the paramedic on the scene “described Wharf’s body as ‘filleted open’ 
. . . and when the paramedics opened the driver’s-side door, more blood 
poured from [the victim’s] chest onto the ground.”15 At 10:40 p.m. Thomas 
Wharf was declared dead.16 An autopsy showed that Wharf had “nine stab 
wounds, including one penetrating [his] left lung . . . and another piercing 
[his] heart.”17 Three witnesses to the crime—Ronald Gray, Lori Pearlman 
and James Ryan—testified at trial.18 At around 10:15 p.m. that night, while 
waiting at a public transportation stop, James Ryan saw a young light-haired 
man with a brown leather jacket walking away from the scene of the mur-
der.19 Mr. Ryan noticed that the boy had blood on his hand and, when he 
inquired about the blood, the boy responded by stating that “he had been in 
a fight and had stabbed someone approximately twenty times.” 20  Upon 
reading about the murder in the paper the next day, Mr. Ryan called the po-
lice and the police later obtained an arrest warrant.21 
The jury found Diatchenko guilty of murder in the first degree, citing 
“deliberate premeditation and malice aforethought, extreme atrocity and 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Commonwealth v. Diatchenko (Diatchenko I), 443 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Mass. 1982). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Beth Schwartzapfel, Would You Let This Man Go Free?, BOSTON MAG. (July 2014), http://
www.bostonmagazine.com/news/article/2014/07/22/let-free-greg-diatchenko/ [https://perma.cc/K7F7-
GMYR]. 
 16 Diatchenko I, 443 N.E.2d at 399. 
 17 See id. In addition, “[t]he right rear pocket of the victim’s pants had been ripped open.” See 
id. 
 18 See id. “Ronald Gray testified that he saw [Diatchenko] alone on Hadassah Way near Park 
Square in Boston” at around 8:00 p.m. the night of the stabbing. See id. Lori Pearlman, whose 
living room “table was located next to an open window overlooking the alley where the stabbing 
occurred,” testified that she heard an individual yell a number of times: “Give me your money, 
you m___ f___.” See id. While on the phone with the police, Ms. Pearlman heard a car horn sound 
for five seconds and then saw a person with light hair and a brown leather jacket run away. See id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
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cruelty, and felony-murder.”22 The judge imposed life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole, a punishment required under Massachusetts Law.23 
On July 29, 1986 Michael Eagles and seventeen-year-old Jeffrey 
Roberio visited the trailer home of seventy-nine year old Lewis Jennings.24 
The following day, Jennings body was found beaten with a blunt force ob-
ject and strangled to death with his pillowcase.25 An autopsy revealed that 
Jennings was alive when his “spine, several ribs, and bones in his neck were 
fractured.”26 Personal property was stolen from the victim’s home, includ-
ing money and a shotgun.27 A jury found Roberio guilty of both murder in 
the first degree and armed robbery and, like Diatchenko, sentenced him to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole.28 
Thirty years later, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Miller v. Alabama, which held that the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution prohibits mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole 
sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.29 Following this decision, Di-
atchenko sought “retroactive application of [Miller’s] prohibition against 
mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders” by filing a 
petition for post-conviction relief with the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts.30 Diatchenko also “filed a petition in the county court . . . chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the sentencing scheme for murder in the first 
degree set forth in [the Massachusetts statute], as it applied to [his case].”31 
In addition, Diatchenko “sought a declaration that art[icle] 26 [of the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution] categorically bar[red] the imposition of a sentence 
of life without parole on offenders who were under the age of eighteen 
when they committed murder in the first degree.”32 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Diatchenko II granted 
Diatchenko’s petition for post-conviction relief, finding that a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison without parole for juvenile homicide offenders, set 
forth by chapter 265, section 2 of Massachusetts General Laws, violated 
article XXVI of the Massachusetts Constitution, which prohibits “cruel or 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. at 400 (finding felony-murder because the perpetrators committed armed robbery in 
addition to the murder). 
 23 See Diatchenko I, 443 N.E.2d at 400. 
 24 See Roberio, 700 N.E.2d at 831. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. In addition, there were “numerous lacerations on [Jennings’s] right hand indicative 
of defensive wounds.” Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Roberio, 700 N.E.2d at 831; Diatchenko I, 443 N.E.2d at 400. 
 29 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 30 Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 270 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455); Roberio, 700 N.E.2d at 
831. 
 31 Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 275. 
 32 MASS. CONST. art. XXVI; Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 275. 
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unusual punishments.”33 Thus, the court created a fifteen-year parole eligi-
bility exception applicable to juvenile homicide offenders. 34  The court 
based its finding on developmental psychology and neuroscience research 
that demonstrated fundamental differences between juvenile and adult 
brains, as well as the heightened capacity of juveniles for positive change 
and rehabilitation.35 
As part of the decision in Diatchenko II, the Supreme Judicial Court 
remanded the case to the county court for further proceedings.36 Diatchenko 
filed a motion to the single justice of the county board requesting funds to 
retain an expert for his parole board hearing.37 Given Diatchenko’s county 
motion, the single judge reported multiple questions to the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts asking whether access to counsel, funds for expert 
witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review of the decision on Di-
atchenko and Roberio’s parole applications were crucial to ensure that their 
opportunity for release on parole would be protected and meaningful.38 The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that, because a juve-
nile homicide offender’s meaningful opportunity to be released on parole is 
necessary for conforming to Eighth Amendment proportionality require-
ments, the parole process itself thus takes on a constitutional liberty interest 
                                                                                                                           
 33 MASS. CONST. art. XXVI; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 2(a); see Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d 
at 276. 
 34 See Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 354 (citing Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 270). 
 35 See Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 282 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65, 2469, 2475). 
 36 Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 354. The court in Diatchenko II remanded to the county court 
“with the direction to enter judgment consistent with the court’s opinion in the case and to ‘take 
such further action as is necessary and appropriate.’” Id. 
 37 Id. (“On February 27, 2014, Diatchenko filed a motion for entry of a judgment that would 
include a number of orders of specific relief, and also filed a motion for funds to retain an expert 
in connection with his hearing before the board.”). The district attorney, chair of the board, and 
commissioner filed oppositions. See id. 
 38 See id. at 354–55. After a hearing, the single justice reserved and reported two questions 
regarding Diatchenko’s case to the SJC. Id. at 354. Roberio was permitted to intervene in the Di-
atchenko case. Id at 355. The single justice asked: 
1. Whether, in order to ensure that the petitioner and other similarly situated juvenile 
homicide offenders receive the ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release’ that is re-
quired by the court’s opinion [in Diatchenko II], they must be afforded: 
 (a) the right to assistance of counsel at their parole hearings, including the right 
to have counsel appointed if they are indigent; and 
 (b) the right to public funds, if they are indigent, in order to secure reasonably 
necessary expert assistance at the hearings. 
2. Whether, in order to ensure that the petitioner and other similarly situated juvenile 
homicide offenders receive the ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release’ that is re-
quired by the court’s opinion, there must be an opportunity for the petitioner or a 
similarly situated individual who is denied parole to obtain judicial review of the pa-
role board’s decision, and if so, what form the judicial review will take. 
Id. at 355. 
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in the form of access to counsel, funds for expert witnesses, and judicial 
review of parole decisions.39 
II. THE COURT’S DECISION TO ENSURE A MEANINGFUL PAROLE PROCESS 
FOR JUVENILE HOMICIDE OFFENDERS 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) agreed in sub-
stance with Diatchenko and Roberio, finding that the petitioners and simi-
larly situated juvenile homicide offenders should have access to counsel, 
access to funds for expert witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review 
on parole decisions.40 In evaluating the petitioners’ claims, the court kept in 
mind constitutional proportionality and the importance of a juvenile homi-
cide offender’s access to a meaningful opportunity for release on parole.41 
A. Access to Counsel 
The SJC held that, given the challenges involved for a juvenile homi-
cide offender serving a mandatory life sentence, the opportunity for parole 
would not be meaningful without access to counsel.42 The majority per-
formed a two-step analysis.43 First, the court considered the constitutionality 
of the parole process for juvenile homicide offenders.44 Second, the court 
discussed the inability of juvenile homicide offenders to effectively advo-
cate for themselves in parole hearings.45 
The majority looked to precedent in the U.S. Supreme Court case Gra-
ham v. Florida, which held that a juvenile can never receive a sentence of 
life in prison without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide crime.46 
The Supreme Court also cited Miller, which observed that, under the Eighth 
Amendment, children are constitutionally different from adults because sen-
tencing a juvenile homicide offender to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole is disproportionate to the crime given the neurological differences 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. at 353, 357. 
 40 Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., (Diatchenko III), 27 N.E.3d 349, 353 
(Mass. 2015). The court in Diatchenko III “remanded [the case] to the county court, where the 
single justice will enter a judgment consistent with [Diatchenko III].” Id. at 368. 
 41 See id. at 353. The court noted that constitutional proportionality means that the punish-
ment of the offender should be proportional to the crime committed in accordance with the Eighth 
Amendment and article XXVI of the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 356 (citing Diatchenko v. 
Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. (Diatchenko II), 1 N.E.3d 270, 270 (Mass. 2013)); see MASS. 
CONST. art. XXVI. 
 42 See Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 361. 
 43 See id. at 356–58, 360–61. 
 44 See id. at 356–58. 
 45 See id. at 360–61. 
 46 See id. at 356, n.10; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
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between children and adults.47 The court further noted the importance of the 
precedent in Diatchenko II’s holding that Diatchenko and similarly situated 
juvenile homicide offenders deserved a “meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”48 
The majority reasoned that, “where the meaningful opportunity for re-
lease through parole is necessary in order to conform the juvenile homicide 
offender’s mandatory life sentence to the requirements of [article XXVI of 
the Massachusetts Constitution], the parole process takes on a constitutional 
dimension [i.e. a liberty interest] that does not exist for other offenders 
whose sentences include parole eligibility.”49 Thus, given the protected lib-
erty interest in juvenile homicide offender parole hearings, the court found 
that juvenile homicide offenders are entitled to procedural protections such as 
access to counsel.50 
The court noted that, for any offender, the question facing the parole 
board is whether the inmate is “likely to reoffend.”51 The court acknowl-
edged that a parole hearing for a juvenile homicide offender “involves com-
plex and multifaceted issues that require the potential marshalling, presenta-
tion, and rebuttal of information derived from many sources.”52 Additional-
ly, victims’ families, which parole boards are particularly sympathetic to, 
and public officials, who are often stronger advocates than the juvenile of-
fender, often contest parole hearings.53 The court noted that juvenile homi-
cide offenders generally “lack the skills and resources to gather, analyze, 
and present this evidence adequately” in their favor, thus their opportunity 
for release would only be meaningful if they had access to counsel.54 
B. Access to Funds for Expert Witnesses 
In addition to access to counsel, Diatchenko and Roberio argued that, 
in order to secure a meaningful opportunity for release as juvenile homicide 
offenders, they needed expert witnesses to provide opinions “concerning the 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d. at 356; see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d 
at 282 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65, 2469, 2475). 
 48 Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 356 (quoting Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 270). 
 49 MASS. CONST. art. XXVI; Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 357. The court acknowledged that 
there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole, but followed Supreme Court prece-
dent that acknowledged that “a liberty interest in parole requiring at least some minimal due pro-
cess rights may derive from language in a State’s parole statute.” Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 357 
(citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 7, 11–12 (1979)). 
 50 See Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 358 (citing Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 
406, 408 (Mass. 1979)). 
 51 Id. at 360. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See id. at 360–61. 
 54 Id. 
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relationship between neurobiological immaturity and culpability in general, 
as well as factors relating to each of their individual and family circum-
stances that may help both to explain past conduct and assess future risk of 
reoffending.”55 The court agreed.56 The majority opinion referenced the sci-
entific research on adolescent brain development cited in Diatchenko II as 
support for the pivotal role an expert witness could play in regards to a ju-
venile homicide offender’s meaningful opportunity for release on parole.57 
The majority noted that, given the liberty interest in post conviction 
proceedings of a juvenile homicide offender, due process procedures are 
necessary to ensure a meaningful opportunity for release on parole.58 Thus, 
the court held that a Superior Court judge may grant the compensation of 
fees for expert witnesses to aid the offender in restricted contexts.59 The 
judge may use his or her discretion to conclude that the “assistance of the 
expert is reasonably necessary to protect the juvenile homicide offender’s 
meaningful opportunity for release.”60 
C. Availability of Judicial Review 
Judicial review of parole decisions for juvenile homicide offenders al-
so became available as a result of the court’s decision in Diatchenko III.61 
The majority held that a parole decision may be brought under certiorari 
review in order to determine whether the parole board abused its discretion 
by failing to take into account attributes relevant to the juvenile homicide 
offender.62 The court reasoned that judicial review of a parole decision is 
appropriate because it protects the juvenile homicide offender’s meaningful 
opportunity for release and provides a safeguard for constitutional propor-
tionality between the juvenile homicide offender and the sentence.63 Thus, 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See id. at 361–62. 
 56 See id. at 362. 
 57 See id. “[S]cientific research on adolescent brain development has revealed ‘myriad signifi-
cant ways that this development impacts a juvenile’s personality and behavior,’ some of which 
suggest decreased moral culpability for certain juvenile homicide offenders or indicate a greater 
potential for them to mature to a point where they no longer engage in the behaviors that led to 
their crimes.” See id. (quoting Diatchenko I, 1 N.E.3d at 284). 
 58 See Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 363. 
 59 See id. “Limited contexts” include situations where the “juvenile offender requires an ex-
pert’s assistance in order to effectively explain the effects of the individual’s neurobiological im-
maturity and other personal circumstances at the time of the crime, and how this information re-
lates to the individual’s present capacity and future risk of reoffending.” Id. 
 60 Id. at 363–64. 
 61 See id. at 365. 
 62 See id. at 366 (“[I]f the judge concludes that the board’s consideration of the juvenile of-
fender’s status as a juvenile and the distinctive attributes of his or her youth did constitute an 
abuse of discretion—was arbitrary and capricious—a remand to the board for rehearing would be 
appropriate.”). 
 63 See id. at 365. 
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judicial review is available “solely to ensure that the board exercise[d]” its 
discretion in a constitutional manner.64 
D. The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Spina 
Justice Francis Spina criticized the majority for making Diatchenko II 
about a new liberty interest, as opposed to limiting Diatchenko II to the pa-
role eligibility of juvenile homicide offenders.65 He argued that Diatchenko 
II “respected juveniles’ constitutional distinctiveness from adults” by creat-
ing an exception in the sentence so as to not make it cruel or unusual, but 
that Diatchenko III overreached the judicial responsibility of sentencing and 
entered the executive duty to carry out the sentence by imposing additional 
procedural protections to the parole hearing process.66 In support, Justice 
Spina noted that the majority cited to Supreme Court authority that “chil-
dren are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”67 
Justice Spina explained that parole and sentencing are distinct.68 He argued 
that the majority should not have created additional procedures in the parole 
process because children and adults should be treated differently solely for 
sentencing, not parole.69 
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES FOR  
JUVENILE HOMICIDE OFFENDERS 
In Diatchenko II, the court correctly interpreted Miller and held that 
juvenile homicide offenders must have an opportunity to be released on pa-
role after fifteen years of incarceration.70 In order for the decision in Di-
                                                                                                                           
 64 See id. “The question for the reviewing judge will be whether the board abused its discre-
tion in the manner in which it considered and dealt with ‘the distinctive attributes of youth [that] 
diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders,’ 
as they relate to the particular circumstances of the juvenile homicide offender seeking parole.” Id 
at 366. 
 65 See id. at 371 (Spina, J., dissenting). 
 66 See id. at 369. Dissenting in accordance with Justice Spina, Justice Cordy noted that the 
majority intruded on what is a function of the executive branch—regulating the conduct of a pa-
role hearing. See id. at 379. (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
 67 See id. at 370 (Spina, J., dissenting) (quoting Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 286 (quoting Mil-
ler v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012))). 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., (Diatchenko III), 27 N.E.3d 349, 
354 (Mass. 2015) (citing Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. (Diatchenko II), 1 
N.E.3d 270, 286–87. (Mass. 2013)). Miller held that, because children are constitutionally differ-
ent from adults for purposes of sentencing, “juveniles convicted of murder in the first degree could 
no longer receive life sentences without the possibility of parole unless a court determined they 
were incorrigible.” See Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 368 (Spina, J., dissenting) (citing Miller, 132 
S. Ct. at 2464). 
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atchenko II to be meaningful, the majority in Diatchenko III justly imposed 
additional procedures for juvenile parole hearings.71 In contrast to the dis-
sent’s concerns about judicial activism, given the constitutional dimension 
of the parole process for juvenile homicide offenders, the court did not 
overstep the role of the executive branch in executing punishments, but in-
stead the majority made a judicial ruling on what the procedural liberty in-
terest in the parole process should entail.72 In so doing, the court provided 
juvenile homicide offenders with additional procedures in the parole pro-
cess, a natural extension of the sentencing determined by a judge.73 
Adopting these additional due process procedures is critical to ensur-
ing that a juvenile homicide offender’s maturity and rehabilitation is proper-
ly demonstrated to a parole board.74 As the majority emphasized, juvenile 
homicide offenders are particularly in need of such procedures because they 
are an at-risk population and are constitutionally different from adults.75 
First, juvenile homicide offenders are an at risk population in need of 
the assistance of counsel during parole hearings because they are typically 
an indigent, powerless group that lack the knowledge and resources to col-
lect and present the evidence necessary to contest the statements of victim’s 
families and public officials that often oppose their parole application.76 
Thus, in order to ensure a meaningful chance of release on parole, juvenile 
homicide offenders need access to counsel to assist them in providing the 
evidence necessary to demonstrate their rehabilitation and ability to be a 
productive member of society.77 
Second, advances in neurological science and common sense suggest 
that juvenile homicide offenders are distinct from adults and thus the Eighth 
Amendment’s proportionality requirement should be applied to juveniles dif-
ferently.78 Juveniles lack the maturity to evaluate their responsibility to others 
and are more easily manipulated to conform to negative pressures in their 
community.79 Thus, juvenile homicide offenders may have diminished culpa-
bility and are more likely to reform in comparison to adults because juvenile 
temperaments are fluid and their harmful actions are less likely to be “evi-
dence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”80 Therefore, providing juvenile homicide 
offenders with funding for expert witnesses is crucial to their opportunity for 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See id. at 353 (majority opinion). 
 72 See id. at 357 n.12. 
 73 See id. 
 74 Id. at 358. 
 75 See id. at 356. 
 76 Id. at 360. 
 77 See id. at 361. 
 78 See Diatchenko II, 1 N.E.3d at 277 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465). 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458). 
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meaningful release because expert witnesses have the knowledge and capaci-
ty to explain the neurobiological differences between juvenile and adult of-
fenders, the future risk of reoffending, and how the circumstances of their 
environments may have contributed to their criminal conduct at the time.81 
Lastly, an abuse of discretion judicial review standard provides a safe-
guard to ensure that the parole board considered “the distinctive attributes of 
youth that diminish the penological justifications for imposing [life sentenc-
es] on juvenile offenders.”82 Implementation of judicial review makes certain 
that proportionality between the juvenile offender and the crime committed is 
properly evaluated to ensure a meaningful opportunity for release on parole.83 
Accordingly, the majority properly instituted access to counsel, access to 
funds for expert witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review in parole 
decisions made on behalf of juvenile homicide offenders.84 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Diatchenko III held 
that juvenile homicide offenders are entitled to (1) representation by coun-
sel at parole hearings, (2) access to funds for expert witnesses in certain 
situations, and (3) an opportunity for judicial review on parole decisions. 
The majority’s decision in Diatchenko III correctly applied the judicial 
power to protect the liberty interest of juvenile homicide offenders by 
providing these additional procedural protections during the parole process. 
Providing due process procedures for juvenile homicide offenders is a 
crucial step forward because members of this voiceless group now have a 
meaningful opportunity to prove their rehabilitation and reenter society. 
However, these procedural rights should also be extended to some adult 
offenders. By distinguishing juveniles from adults as the basis for finding a 
liberty interest in the parole process of juvenile homicide offenders, the 
court implies that such rights would not be extended to non-juvenile offend-
ers if such a case were to be tried in front of the court. Nevertheless, Di-
atchenko III is a positive revelation that could lead to the court also consid-
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Diatchenko III, 27 N.E.3d at 361–62. In particular, the court acknowledged that access 
to expert opinion would be crucial to Roberio’s opportunity for release because, when Roberio 
was forty-four years old, a neuropsychologist conducted a physiological evaluation and found 
“that many of the neurobiological and behavioral challenges Roberio experienced in his teenage 
years had resolved,” thus an expert witness could “[explain] the path of [Roberio’s] apparent 
growth in cognitive and emotional maturity and its relationship to the question of whether he 
would be likely to reoffend if released on parole.” Id. at 362 n.23. 
 82 Id. at 366 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465). 
 83 See id. at 367. 
 84 Id. at 353. 
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ering the liberty interests and rights for certain adult offenders sentenced to 
life with the possibility of parole. 
Diatchenko III held that, for juvenile homicide offenders, the standard 
parole proceedings were not meaningful because of the challenges juvenile 
homicide offenders encounter when they attempt to advocate on their own 
behalf. However, the challenges discussed are not limited to juvenile homi-
cide offenders; many adult offenders will “lack the [necessary] skills and re-
sources” to navigate “complex and multifaceted issues” inherent to parole 
proceedings.85 Although article XXVI of the Massachusetts Constitution and 
chapter 265, section 2 of the Massachusetts General Laws do not mandate 
parole availability for adult homicide offenders, it is unlikely that the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts would agree that parole-eligible adults 
are not entitled to a meaningful parole hearing. Thus, the parole board should 
be required to offer additional procedures to offenders that can assist them in 
demonstrating any mitigating circumstances similar to those attributed to ju-
venile homicide offenders. 
The court properly decided the case given the issue in front of them. 
Nevertheless, if the court is presented with a case of a non-juvenile offender 
that possesses mitigating circumstances similar to those of juveniles, it 
should hold that they too have a liberty interest in the parole process so that 
justifications for their release are properly presented to a parole board 
through additional procedural protections. 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See id. at 360. 
